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1. Preface
This paper about a Canadian reemployment incentives experiment was written at the 
request of the Social Research and Demonstration Corporation for a one day conference 
scheduled for July 21, 1994 to be hosted by the Manpower Demonstration Research 
Corporation in New York City. The aim of the paper is to clearly state recommendations 
concerning treatment design, sample design, implementation, administration, and evaluation 
for the experiment being planned by Human Resources Development Canada.
A comprehensive packet of conference materials has been compiled and provided to 
conference participants. To maintain brevity this paper presumes exposure to that material. 
In particular, readers of this paper should be familiar with the concept design paper prepared 
by the Innovations Branch of Employment and Immigration Canada and the W.E. Upjohn 
Institute for Employment Research in March of 1992, and the paper on treatment design for 
a cash reemployment bonus experiment written by Howard Bloom for this conference.
2. Introduction
The unemployment insurance (UI) program in Canada is one of the world's most 
generous. It is also believed to prolong spells of unemployment unnecessarily. The 
nationwide field experiment being planned will operate within the UI system. The 
experiment is being undertaken to test if various possible UI program features encourage 
more intensive job search and earlier acceptance of job offers by UI claimants. The hope is 
that new ways to significantly reduce the length of time that UI claimants remain unemployed 
and draw UI benefits will be identified.
The recent general rise in unemployment rates among industrialized countries has 
been accompanied by an effort to increase the share of public resources spent on active 
relative to passive labor market support policies. 1 This change has come in response to the 
rise in the proportion of the unemployed who are permanently separated from their job and 
unlikely to return to their previous industry or occupation. In an effort to restrain public 
spending and minimize tax burdens, particular active efforts have been made to improve 
reemployment opportunities for displaced workers. Services are targeted to the displaced, 
partly because they are frequently eligible for a long duration of unemployment compensation 
and have a high probability of benefit exhaustion.
The reemployment incentives considered in the earlier concept design paper were 
three: (1) a cash bonus a lump sum payment in addition to regular UI entitlement, (2) a 
partial cash-out an advance lump sum payment out of the regular UI entitlement, and (3) a
'Leigh (1994, Chapter 6, p. 4) says that in particular "Britain, Canada, and Australia- 
have in common recent major restructuring of their employment and training programs 
involving the shift of resources from passive to active labor market policies."
wage supplement periodic cash payments to supplement earnings on a qualifying new job. 
These three interventions are the focus of this paper.
Other possible UI program modifications include: additional job search assistance, 
stiffened work search requirements, and referral to job skill training. While each of these 
interventions has been shown to have potential, all have difficulties in consistently repeating 
the experimental conditions for random trials. In recent years Canada has provided job 
search skills training and job club organization modules to many of the newly emerging 
market economies in Eastern Europe. These modules may be sufficiently standardized to be 
repeated consistently. Canada already has the Active Job Search program, whereby UI 
claimants identified to have skills in demand are required to submit a Job Search Record 
summarizing reemployment efforts every two weeks to maintain UI benefit eligibility. Such 
a program could be experimentally extended. Experimentally broadening formal work search 
requirements would be effective if local labor market information systems are deficient in 
assigning claimants to Active Job Search. However, it would probably only result in 
fruitless job search, amounting to an annoyance to employers. Furthermore, previous 
experiments in UI suggest that additional supportive services affect claimants merely as 
added work search requirements. Finally, evaluation of job skill retraining should be viewed 
as a separate project.
3. The Context of a Canadian Reemployment Incentives Experiment
To place the discussion of a Canadian reemployment incentives experiment in context 
two tables are presented. Table 1 summarizes the national labor market situation over the 
past 20 years. In 1992 the national unemployment rate approached levels reached during the 
major recession of the early 1980s. A distinguishing feature of the more recent period is that 
the current average duration of unemployment is nearly 4 weeks longer than in the earlier 
period. Obviously, the longer duration means a greater burden on the UI system.
Table 2 summarizes results from The Labour Force Survey conducted by Statistics 
Canada on the regional distribution of the labor force, unemployment, and UI claims among 
the provinces. It is evident that the unemployment problems are most severe in the Eastern 
provinces than the Western ones.
4. Design of the Reemployment Bonus Offers 
4.1 A Small Number of Treatments
As suggested by Howard Bloom, it is most important that the effect of each treatment 
studied can be estimated with statistical precision. Therefore, it is better to run an 
experiment with only a few treatments and large samples in each treatment than to run an




































































































































Source: The Labor Force Survey, Canadian Social Trends, Spring 1991 and Canadian Economic Observer, 
Historical Statistical Supplement, 1991-92.
Table 2: Labor Force, Unemployment, and UI Claims in Canada by Province for Recent Years
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1st Qtr 
Newfoundland
Labor Force (thousands) 
Unemployment Rate (percent) 
Avg. Weekly UI Claims (thousands)
Prince Edward Island
Labor Force (thousands) 
Unemployment Rate (percent) 
Avg. Weekly UI Claims (thousands)
Nova Scotia
Labor Force (thousands) 
Unemployment Rate (percent) 
Avg. Weekly UI Claims (thousands)
New Brunswick
Labor Force (thousands) 
Unemployment Rate (percent) 
Avg. Weekly UI Claims (thousands)
Quebec
Labor Force (thousands) 
Unemployment Rate (percent) 
Avg. Weekly UI Claims (thousands)
Ontario
Labor Force (thousands) 
Unemployment Rate (percent) 
Avg. Weekly UI Claims (thousands)
Manitoba
Labor Force (thousands) 
Unemployment Rate (percent) 
Avg. Weekly UI Claims (thousands)
Saskatchewa
Labor Force (thousands) 
Unemployment Rate (percent) 
Avg. Weekly UI Claims (thousands)
Alberta
Labor Force (thousands) 
Unemployment Rate (percent) 
Avg. Weekly UI Claims (thousands)
British Columbia
Labor Force (thousands) 
Unemployment Rate (percent) 






















































































































































































experiment with many treatments and small sample sizes. This point is relevant to all 
treatment designs including bonus, cash-out, and wage supplements.
4.2 The Bonus Amount
Clearly the size of the bonus offer affects the likelihood of returning to work. Very 
large bonus offers also make precise estimation of impacts more likely. However, the size 
of the bonus offers tested must be reasonable policy options, which might survive political 
scrutiny. Evidence from Washington suggests that claimants below the maximum weekly 
benefit rate (WBR) responded more strongly to the bonus offer. This suggests that the bonus 
should be set as a multiple of the WBR, in order to best understand behavioral response.
The suggestion of 5 and 10 times the WBR is a good one.
4.3 Search Period
Before the experiments with variable search periods were conducted, Mortenson 
(1988) predicted that longer search periods would result in smaller treatment effects. 
However the observed effect is the opposite. That is, longer search periods resulted in 
bigger treatment impacts. Part of this difference may have been due to the fact that 
institutional rigidities involved in finding and starting a job created difficulties for those given 
only 3 or 4 weeks to search. It is also appropriate to set the search period to mesh with 
other standard CEC practices such as the Active Job Search program which operates on a 
two-week cycle.
Given that the entitled duration of UI benefits in Canada depends more on labor 
demand in the region than an individual's prior earnings experience, it is not necessary to set 
search periods as multiples of entitled benefit durations. Sharper experimental response will 
result if the search period is set at a fixed number of weeks. With the average duration of 
unemployment at about 25 weeks, the majority of eligible claimants qualifying for 50 weeks 
of benefits, and national unemployment exceeding 11% reasonable search periods about 20% 
and 40% of entitled duration might be tested.
Two search periods might be considered: 10 and 20 weeks. 
4.4 Fixed Reemployment Period
All US experiments set the reemployment period at approximately four months. This 
was deemed long enough to ensure that qualifying reemployment did not occur in seasonal 
work. To simplify administration of the experiment the reemployment period should be set 
in terms of a fixed number of weeks.
A single reemployment period set at 20 weeks might be used.
4.5 What is the definition of return to work?
To have consistent evaluation of bonus eligibility the definition of qualifying 
reemployment must be clearly specified. If a legal definition of full time employment in the 
Canadian UI law exists, it should be used. It is also possible to set a fixed number of hours- 
-say 35 per week to define a full-time job. However, the natural definition within the UI 
system is to require earnings on the new job sufficient to result in a zero UI payment under 
the partial benefit schedule earnings disregard of .25*WBR and 100% tax thereafter.
5. The Partial Cash-out
5.1 A New Treatment for Experimenters
The partial cash-out offer is something not previously tested, but it is much more 
likely to be implemented by policy makers than a straight bonus. It was not tried in the US 
experiments because, from the perspective of claimants' legal rights, it was an easier matter 
to experiment with something like the bonus which is an add on to basic benefit rights. That 
HRD Canada is interested in testing the cash-out option is good, particularly if the legal 
issues involved in conducting the experiment do not prevent or delay random trials.
5.2 Larger Sample Sizes
Howard Bloom is probably correct that a partial cash-out offer is likely to have a 
smaller effect for a given dollar amount and search period than a cash bonus offer. 
However, instead of increasing the offer amount of the cash-out treatments, I would favor 
simply increasing the sample sizes for the cash-out offers relative to identical bonus offers. 
Increased sample sizes should be possible since the cash-out treatments would be cheaper to 
the UI fund per offer than the bonus offers. Having cash-out offers with the same other 
parameters as the bonus offers would allow clear assessment of the effect of the cash-out 
offer.
Incentive Amounts: 5*WBR and 10*WBR 
Search Periods: 10 weeks and 20 weeks 
Reemployment Period: 20 weeks
The above list specifies four cash-out treatments, and is the exact same list as 
suggested for the bonus treatments. Because the cash out treatments should be cheaper to 
run, it may be possible to eliminate one or two of the bonus offers, say the (10*WBR, 10 
week) or the (5*WBR, 20 week) since the remaining comparable offers can be used to form 
a bridge between the bonus and cash-out offers to estimate impacts.
5.3 Bundling of Treatments
It has been suggested that some additional features be added to some of the offers. 
Possibilities include job search assistance and referral to retraining. This may be done 
provided that clear evaluation possibilities are preserved. It should always be possible to 
compare each intervention with the baseline program. Unfortunately this was not the case in 
the New Jersey experiment (Corson et al., 1989), where the only treatment offering a cash 
bonus also included a ISA component. At a minimum, each separate intervention should 
have a separate treatment, with treatments having compound interventions added as budget 
limits permit.
6. The Wage Supplement
6.1 The Appeal of the Wage Supplement
In accepted usage a wage subsidy means a payment directly to an employer, and a 
wage supplement means a payment directly to a worker. There is much less evidence about 
the latter, but results from the wage subsidy suggest that a supplement may be more 
effective. The main appeal of the wage supplement is that it is unlikely to create the type of 
stigma which employers may attribute to workers for whom they receive wage subsidies.
Most programs for the unemployed are either income support or labor supply 
enhancing. The wage subsidy is a labor demand stimulus. But regardless of the form of 
delivery of the subsidy to employers, it apparently has a stigmatizing effect on workers. An 
obvious alternative is the wage supplement which is paid directly to workers. This type of 
program has even been recommended to help welfare recipients, who might face the most 
severe stigma, gain reemployment.2
New entrants to the labor market and those who recently left other jobs frequently 
pass up reasonable job offers because they over estimate their value to potential employers. 
That is, they set their reservation wages unrealistically high. 3 While both the new entrant 
and the job leaver may bring general skills, neither brings firm specific skills needed in their 
new place of work. A wage supplement program where the payment is made directly to the 
worker during the initial period of employment, perhaps one year, may help shorten 
unemployment durations by inducing job searchers to lower their reservation wages. During 
the period of the wage supplement, workers will gain job specific skills thereby increasing 
their value to the firm and qualifying them for any available wage increases. A wage
2See for example Lerman (1985).
3The reservation wage is the minimum wage rate that a worker will accept to begin a 
new job.
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supplement paid directly to the worker removes the state from employee-employer 
interactions and greatly reduces the chance of a stigma affecting an employer's hiring 
decision. Ideally, by the time the wage supplement expires a worker's earnings would have 
risen within the firm. In the meantime society has benefitted from added production, 
government has gained added tax revenues, and the unemployment insurance system has 
saved benefit payments.
6.2 Related Research
Among the four trials of wage subsidies in the United States two operated as 
government programs run through the tax system and two worked as voucher experiments. 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s the New Jobs Tax Credit and the Targeted Jobs Tax 
Credit allowed employers to reduce tax payments by a fraction of the amount paid to workers 
hired under the programs. Hamermesh and Rees (1984, p. 99) say that New Jobs Tax 
Credits were taken for one-third of all the new jobs created during the period it was in 
effect, but Perloff and Wachter (1979) estimate that it resulted in just 3 percent more jobs 
than would have been created without the program. The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) 
was intended to increase employment among certain targeted disadvantaged groups. 
Hollenbeck and Wilke (1991) find that the TJTC increased labor market success of "nonwhite 
male youth, but is stigmatizing for eligible individuals from other race/sex groups." This 
finding that a wage subsidy acts as a stigma carries through to the experimental studies.
A targeted wage subsidy was operated as a field experiment with random trials in 
1980-81 by the U.S. Department of Labor in Dayton, Ohio. Burtless (1985, p. 106) 
reported "the results show conclusively that workers known to be eligible for targeted wage 
subsidies were significantly less likely to find jobs than were otherwise identical workers 
whose eligibility for subsidies was not advertised." Burtless (1985, p. 105) "speculates that 
the vouchers had a stigmatizing effect and provided a screening device with which employers 
discriminated against economically disadvantaged workers."
Another experiment testing an intervention which amounted to a wage subsidy was 
not restricted to economically disadvantaged workers, but may have also stigmatized job 
seekers. Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987) report that for the Illinois Reemployment Bonus 
Experiment, cash bonuses paid directly to persons who gain reemployment have a powerful 
effect in reducing the duration of unemployment. Yet if a cash payment for hiring a job 
seeker is made to employers, the effect is almost nil. Employers may be reluctant to hire 
workers who present a voucher for payment from the state because it signals that the worker 
may have "hidden" characteristics which hinder their finding employment without a state 
subsidy.
6.3 The Previously Suggested Approach to Treatments
The wage supplement operates to reduce or prevent loss of income to job seekers who 
take jobs that provide lower weekly earnings or lower hourly wage rates than experienced
- 8 -
prior to layoff. The intent is to encourage laid off workers to be realistic about their 
earnings prospects on new jobs. A wage supplement is unlikely to induce workers to take 
jobs that would be unacceptable, but may encourage them to take satisfactory, but less 
remunerative jobs, sooner than otherwise. A wage supplement scheme has two major 
components: the weekly supplement amount, and the constraints imposed on either the 
weekly supplement amount or the total amount of the supplement, or both. To make the idea 
of a wage supplement concrete four examples of possible designs are offered:
1. Pre-unemployment weekly earnings minus post-unemployment weekly earnings.
2. 80% of pre-unemployment weekly earnings minus post-unemployment weekly 
earnings.
3. 80% of the pre-unemployment minus post-unemployment earnings difference.
4. Post-unemployment hours x (pre-unemployment hourly wage rate minus the post- 
unemployment hourly wage rate).
5. Pre-unemployment weekly earnings minus post-unemployment weekly earnings up 
to the WBR.
6. Pre-unemployment weekly earnings minus post-unemployment weekly earnings up 
to 80% of the WBR.
Other designs are also possible. This type of design may be most necessary for 
claimants with a history of particularly high earnings and a potential for future high earnings. 
If on the other hand a program is sought which would only subsidize earnings below $1,000 
per week a simpler approach, which is only a slight modification of existing procedures 
might be adopted. This is discussed in the following sub-section.
6.4 Simply Reforming the Present System
An important feature of the wage supplement is that it could be easily administered 
through the existing facilities of the local and provincial CEC offices with computations and 
payments made in a fashion similar to that done for unemployment benefit recipients who 
report earnings on their bi-weekly claimant report. This approach minimizes the troublesome 
problems of stigma since employers are left out of the transaction.
Because of the way existing UI rules are structured, the most natural way to 
implement a wage supplement experiment or program would be simply to modify the UI 
partial benefits scheme so as to improve the incentive for beneficiaries to work their way off 
the UI system. All mechanisms for knowing the prior earnings, receiving timely reports on 
current weekly earnings, and computer support for figuring payments and mailing checks 
exists in the CEC network. Furthermore, because the WBR is equal to 57% of previous
-9 -
earnings for earnings up to $780 per week the maximum WBR is $445, and the number of 
reasonable wage supplement schemes which can be developed within this system is huge. By 
selecting the appropriate earnings disregard and tax on earnings many different desired wage 
supplement systems can be tried or implemented with very little difficulty for claimants or 
clerks (insurance agents).
As mentioned above the existing partial benefit system is structured as follows:
Earnings Disregard = .25*WBR
Tax on Earning above Disregard = 100%
This system provides a strong disincentive for part-time or lower wage work at more than 
just a minimal level. This system has an earnings break-even level of 1.25*WBR (or $569 at 
the maximum WBR of $445) and no incentive for further work beyond earnings of 
.25*WBR. Modification of the system to an alternative partial benefit system like the 
following:
Earnings Disregard = .25*WBR
Tax on Earning above Disregard = 50%
may induce many people to begin jobs which have low initial earnings but good growth 
potential. This system has an earnings break-even level of 2.25*WBR (or $1,001 at the 
maximum WBR of $445) and a good incentive for further work beyond earnings of 
.25*WBR. The change in the income expansion path suggested by this change is presented 
graphically in Figure 1.
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Figure 1
Claimant Earnings Under the Existing 
and an Alternative Partial Benefit System











Existing System: Earnings Disregard = .25 * WBR; Tax Rate = 100% 
Alternate System: Earnings Disregard = .25 * WBR; Tax Rate = 50%
The simple algebra of a partial benefit system involves:
E = weekly earnings,
R = the weekly earnings disregard,
t = the fraction of earnings deducted from benefits,
Y = total weekly income,
WBR = the weekly benefit rate,
and is described by a single equation:
Y = E + WBR-tx(E-R),
a claimant works off the system when WBR = tX(E - R) or:
E* = (WBR/t) + R,
this is called "breakeven earnings" since E* = Y*-
Consider an individual with a history of earning $20 per hour for 40 hours per week. 
Will a change in the in the benefit reduction tax from 100% to 50% affect whether she 
accepts a job paying $10 per hour for 40 hours per week? Currently such a person would be 
eligible for a WBR of $445 which might continue if the $10 job is not accepted.4 Under the 
present partial benefits system if she accepts the job her weekly income will be about $556 
under the alternative her income would be just over $700.
6.5 Duration of the Wage Supplement
A critical parameter to set in designing a wage supplement treatment is length of 
time that a wage supplement will be paid. The wage supplement is intended to encourage 
workers to spend enough time on a new job so that they develop firm specific skills which 
will raise their earnings within the firm. On the other hand, the hope is that the wage 
supplement will result in reduced overall UI benefit payments. A balancing of these aims 
would suggest that one year from the date of claiming benefits is an appropriate duration for 
a wage supplement to continue. By setting the duration of the wage supplement at one year 
from the date of filing a UI claim, the supplement period will coincide with the claimant's UI 
benefit year.
An alternative means of limiting the duration of the supplement is to set a maximum 
number of dollars which may be paid out. This might be all or some part of a claimant's 
dollar UI entitlement remaining at the time of reemployment, which is his WBR multiplied
4Or the WBR may drop to $400 since the replacement rate drops to 50% for refusal of 
suitable work.
by his weeks of entitlement. For example if 25 weeks of benefits are available for someone 
with a WBR of $300, then $7,500 would be the maximum available for supplement payment. 
It might be reasonable to allow half of this amount to be available for wage supplements. 
This would act as a further incentive for early return to work.
7. Sample Design
7.1 Target Population
As proposed in the earlier concept design paper, the appropriate target group is 
comprised of UI claimants eligible to receive regular UI benefits without disqualification for 
any issue involving separation from the previous employer. Within the target group, 
incentive payments would not be made if the claimant was recalled to a previous job or 
placed on the job through a union hiring hall.
7.2 Sample Size and Site Selection
The sample size in each treatment cell is dictated by two aims: to have confidence 
that an ineffective policy is not implemented, and that an effective policy is not rejected. In 
statistical parlance, HRD Canada wants to minimize the chance of rejecting the null 
hypothesis that an intervention does not have an effect when it really does (probability of 
type I error), but it would also like to increase the probability of accepting the alternative 
hypothesis of an effect when one exists (probability of avoiding a Type II error, or power of 
the test).
Following Cohen (1988), the standard reference for power analysis in the behavioral 
sciences, the usual statistical requirements to meet these objectives are: (1) a statistical 
significance level of 5%, which means that if a program is judged effective there is only a 
5% chance of being wrong, and (2) the power of statistical tests will be set at 80%, which 
means that when a program is effective our test will reveal it to be effective 80% of the 
time. More powerful tests would increase the reliability of the results, but require 
substantially larger samples.
With the statistical criteria established, the sample size for each treatment is 
determined on the basis of an estimate of the expected effect of the treatment on weeks of 
unemployment. In the proposed experimental designs, the sample sizes will be set to detect 
these effects for Canada as a whole, and for effects roughly twice that size at the provincial 
level.
The sample sizes are smaller for more generous treatments, because in the U.S. 
experiments larger bonuses generated larger responses, and a smaller sample is required to 
detect a larger impact with a given level of statistical confidence.
The sample size requirements listed in Table 3 are derived from statistical tables on 
the assumption that weeks of regular UI compensation in Canada has a standard deviation of 
12.6 weeks this was the value for 1989, and that the control group size is 15,000.
The assumption concerning the size of the control group is important because the 
confidence in the result will be greater the larger the sample size. Larger samples may be 
achieved by increasing both treatment and control groups equally, or by increasing one 
holding the other constant. 5
Dealing with a claimant assigned to a treatment group is costly. It involves giving an 
enrollment interview, monitoring claimant activity, perhaps making a cash incentive 
payment, and maintaining data on the claimant's activity. Only the last of these costs- 
maintaining data is associated with a control assigned claimant, and this cost is minimal. So 
that by having a large control group the size of expensive treatment groups can be reduced 
without loss of statistical confidence or power. For the effect sizes expected for the CRIE 
treatments, there are no great statistical gains for increasing the control group beyond 15,000 
observations.
The information in Table 3 is headed Canada and Province. It is proposed that the 
treatments be conducted in five provinces: Ontario, Quebec, a maritime province (either 
Newfoundland or Nova Scotia), and two western provinces (perhaps Alberta and British 
Columbia). The treatment samples listed under the province heading are one-fifth those 
listed under the Canada heading.
The sample size requirements given in Table 3, assume that the full sample is evenly 
distributed across the five provinces in which enrollment is anticipated. To clarify the 
usefulness of this sample allocation consider the following example: a national random 
sample of 3,500 will allow detection of a 0.6 week change in UI compensation at the national 
level, and a 1.3 week change at the provincial level.
5 In this case the relevant measure of sample size is called the "harmonic mean." The 
harmonic mean is two times the product of the sample sizes divided by the sum of the sample 
sizes:
nh = [2ntnc/(nt + nc)],
where nt is the size of a treatment group and nc is the size of the control group. By this 




Sample Sizes Required to Detect Treatment Effects 































a Treatment Sample: The number of claimants assigned to the treatment who are eligible to 
participate in the experiment. The control group size is 15,000.
A final point about sample size and subgroup analyses should be made. EIC will 
likely want to know subgroup effects by:
- Repeater status, i.e., claimants who had collected benefits in previous years are 
repeaters.
- Length of entitlement.
- Province.
- Regions facing different economic conditions and circumstances.




To examine treatment impacts by subgroup, larger sample sizes are needed to yield 
adequate precision. For example, a four way partition of the sample by gender and age 
would result in samples about twenty-five percent of the average size. Such sub-group 
analyses can be conducted with slightly more power for all of Canada as indicated in Table 3 
for individual provinces.
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Regarding site selection, it would be reasonable to conduct enrollment in about 10 
CECs in each of the five provinces selected. These may be selected via stratified random 
sampling, or in a strategic fashion. If CECs are selected with care and information is 
gathered at sufficiently similar comparison sites, it may be possible to conduct a matched site 
displacement study in a province where pairs of comparable labor markets can be identified. 
This may be possible in Ontario.
8. Administration of the Experiment
Upon review, recommendations for administration of an experiment presented in the 
earlier concept design paper remain reasonable and appropriate. The elements which bear 
repeating or elaboration are outlined in the following.
8.1 Procedures and Responsibility in the Local Office
It is expected that approximately 50 CECs will be involved in the experiment. A 
generalized set of procedures should be designed and incorporated into a Procedures Manual 
that gives explicit instructions to the office managers as to how claimants are to be selected 
for the experiment, assigned to a treatment, enrolled into the experiment, and informed about 
their options and responsibilities. The manual will also inform the office manager about the 
records to be kept and transmitted to the Central office.
The local CEC office is the key point of contact with claimants, who claim UI 
benefits in total ignorance of new incentive offers being tested. It is critical that each 
claimant, regardless of the office in which he/she files for benefits, has the appropriate 
opportunity to participate in the experiment, if eligible, and is provided with the correct 
information. To ensure that the experimental conditions are repeated exactly, the procedures 
and information flows must be identical in all offices.
The most important local office task is the conduct of the enrollment interview. The 
interview format and content should be designed by the research team and transmitted to the 
local office managers in a formal training process.
For the bonus and partial cash-out treatments, to help make the enrollment process 
consistent, a standard information sheet should be prepared. This information sheet should 
be presented to randomly selected claimants at the end of their benefit rights interview. The 
sheet should be personalized by a CEC clerk (Insurance Agent) in the presence of a claimant, 
and should explain the precise terms of the incentive offer for that individual. It should be 
presented at the very end of the benefit rights interview so that the treatment is a simple add 
on to the standard services provided to all UI claimants. The details of the offer should be 
confirmed by a letter sent from the Central Office for the experiment.
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experimental design. The Central Office should also supervise the process of enrollment. 
Staff in the Central Office should send the appropriate letters and forms to prospective 
participants. They will then receive and process the Notices of Hire, telling the office that 
the participant has obtained employment and believes him or herself eligible for a bonus 
offer. The office is responsible for verifying the validity of the Notice and properly 
communicating with the participant. The Central office will receive, process, and verify 
vouchers for incentive payments. Lastly, they will authorize payment of bonuses. Central 
office staff must keep appropriate records and assure entries into the data base designed to 
carry out the evaluation.
8.3 Data Systems
There is need to access the UI benefit data in order to detennine eligibility for 
enrollment and to validate submission of Notices of Hire and Vouchers for payment. It 
would be best if random selection of participants for the experiment could be an automated 
function of the claims processing system (BNOP file).
There is also need to establish a data system to monitor the flow of claimants in order 
to detennine that the appropriate numbers of claimants are being enrolled and that payment 
budgets are being met. Since Canada does not have wage reporting, there is wage data only 
on workers who claim benefits. Thus, the wage files cannot be used for post-termination 
analysis of reemployment. Since this is critical to the evaluation, it will be necessary to 
conduct a follow-up survey of all assigned claimants, including those in the control group, to 
determine post-filing work experiences. Lastly there is need to construct the final evaluation 
data base, which will use data from the benefit files and the survey. The data systems and 
the programming necessary to access existing data bases will be developed during the design 
phase of the experiment.
8.4 Staff Assignment and Training
There will be both central office and local office staffs. In the Central office, there 
needs to be a Project Manager, an Assistant Project Manager, responsible for site 
supervision, a Programmer and a number of data entry and file clerks to process the 
information and forms. These include the UI benefit information underlining the enrollment 
decision, the Notices of Hire (Notice that the participant obtain an appropriate job), the 
Vouchers (requests for incentive payments), and the payment authorizations.
In each of the local offices (CECs), there will need to be agency personnel 
responsible for carrying out the assignment of claimants and conduct the enrollment 
interviews. The exact organizational structure for the local office activities needs to be 
determined.
Once assigned, all personnel in the experiment would need a short, but rigorous 
training in the procedures. The research team will design Training Manuals and conduct 
Train-the-Trainer sessions for the supervisory and management personnel involved in the
experiment. An ongoing process of staff training will be needed to assure compliance with 
the experimental design.
9. Using Results from an Experiment 
9.1 Making Inferences from an Experiment
Bruce Meyer (1974) has pointed out three main concerns in using experimental 
findings to estimate impacts of an actual reemployment bonus program. They may be called 
the displacement effect, the take-up rate, and the entry effect.
When increased speed of return to work by treatment assigned claimants slows the 
return to work by claimants not assigned to a treatment, displacement has occurred. Carl 
Davidson and Steve Woodbury (1991b) have estimated that displacement did indeed occur in 
the Illinois experiment. However, they also identified a factor which may ameliorate any 
displacement which exists. Using a job matching simulation model to analyze a 
reemployment bonus, they find that increased search effort by bonus-offered workers 
improves the performance of the economy by creating new jobs since the available job 
openings are filled more quickly. The existence of displacement resulting from a bonus offer 
is an empirical question, which can best be answered in an experiment involving saturation 
enrollment at selected sites and monitoring of claimants at comparison sites.
In the reemployment bonus experiments, the take-up rate is the share of those 
qualifying for a bonus who cash one. It has been reported that in the U.S. experiments only 
about 65% of claimants thought to be eligible for a bonus received one. In a "real11 program 
this proportion could be greater. However, many of those thought to be eligible may indeed 
not have been. It may be the case that claimants recognized their ineligibility because of 
placement by a union hiring hall, recall to a previous job, or a gap in their continuous 
reemployment. Meyer (1994) speculates that if the bonus became a regular part of the UI 
program the take-up rate would probably increase. However, he admits that in a program 
"additional people might respond to a bonus by reducing their UI spells as it became more 
common to find a job quickly to receive a bonus." The net effect on the benefit-cost ratio of 
these opposing forces may be positive, negative, or zero.
Meyer (1994) notes that there may be additional entry to UI as a result of a bonus 
offer. One is the increased likelihood that an unemployed person would file for benefits. 
This may be a problem in the United States. Rebecca Blank and David Card (1991) have 
estimated that only about 70% of eligible U.S. claimants receive regular UI benefits so that 
the potential for entry in the U.S. is significant. However, David Card and Craig Riddell 
(1991) find that the proportion of unemployed in Canada receiving UI benefits hovers very 
close to one, so that if a bonus program were implemented in Canada, there much less 
likelihood that UI claims would increase.
The experiments provided some other information particularly relevant to Canadian 
UI policy. In Illinois, because of an extended benefits program, more than half the claimants 
offered a reemployment bonus were eligible for 38 weeks of benefits. The remainder were 
eligible for only 26 weeks of state-regular UI benefits. The bonus offer reduced the duration 
of unemployment for claimants eligible for extended benefits, by more than double the 
reduction of claimants eligible for 26 weeks of benefits (see Davidson and Woodbury 199la). 
The longer entitlement available to extended benefits recipients is more like that available in 
Canada.
9.2 What Should be Gained from an Experiment?
The most exciting prospects for the Canadian Reemployment Incentives experiment 
are that it will yield information on the incentive effects of the previously untested partial 
cash-out incentive design, and the promising wage supplement which has also not really been 
experimentally evaluated before either.
Further tests of the reemployment bonus experiments will add to the understanding 
about the effect of long entitled durations and higher bonus payments. This information 
should increase the value of previous bonus experiments and suggest new ways to examine 
those earlier results.
More generally, the experiment will add to the evaluation expertise within HRD 
Canada and the Applied Research Branch. The control sample gathered will also provide a 
handy data base for quick examination of future questions about program modification.
Naturally, the real aim is that by experimentally evaluating program innovations 
costly errors due to implementing inappropriate designs will be avoided.
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